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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH
ECHO NEY, TRUSTEE,
WASATCH HOMES, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No.
8437

G. T. HARRISON and
ALDA J. HARRISON,
Defendants and Respondents.

Brief of Respondent
STATEJ\IENT OF FACTS
This is an action to recover a real estate commission.
The case arose out of the sale of certain real property
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, known as the Snow
Apartments.
On September 16, 1952, the defendants and respondents were the joint owners of an equity in the Snow
Apartments. On that date, or shortly thereafter, respondents entered into an Earnest Money Agreement
for the sale of this equity interest to one Einar Asp and
1
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his wife. One Dean Perry, an agent of plaintiff and
appellant Wasatch Homes, Inc., was instrumental in
obtaining the signatures of respondents to the Earnest
Money Agreement. (R. 114, 115)
Dean Perry, either individually or in his capacity
as agent of Wasatch Homes, Inc., was not a party to
the Earnest Money Agreement. A listing contract was
never signed between respondents, or either of them,
and Wasatch Homes, Inc. (R. 114, 115)
Subsequently, the Snow Apartments were sold to
Einar Asp. The sale was later set aside by the Third
_District Court because of the default of Asp. (R. 115)
On November 12, 1953, appellants brought an action
against the respondents for a real estate commission for
the sale to Asp. It was alleged that Wasatch Homes,
Inc., was entitled to a commission for procuring a purchaser for the Snow Apartments, and that Wasatch
Homes, Inc., had assigned its claim to Echo X ey, Trustee.
(R. 1, 2)
On December 9, 1953, a default was entered by the
appellants against Aida J. Harrison, and on the same
day the appellants obtained a default judgment against
her for the entire amount claimed. (R. 3, 4)
On Februan· 27, 1954, G. T. Harrison filed his
answer to Appellants' Complaint.
On Ort.ohcr 30, 1954, Aida J. Harrison made a motion, supported by her a:ffida\·it, to set aside the default
and default judgment entered against her. (R. 15, 16)
The motion was set for hearing. Counsel for both
2
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appellants and respondents were present to argue the
motion, but no evidence was offered beyond the affidavit
of Mrs. Harrison.
On November 15, 1954, the court entered an order
setting aside the default and default judgment. (R. 17)
On April 26, 1955, the cause was tried to the court
on the Amended Complaint of the appellants, and on
September 21, 1955, the court entered judgment in favor
of the respondents, no cause of action. (R. 116)
Appellants now appeal both from the order vacating
the default and default judgment and also from the
final judgment.
The statement of points and argument will be
divided into two sections. Section I will deal with the
order vacating the default and default judgment; Section II will concern the Final Judgment.
SECTION I
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. THE SUPREME COURT CAN ONLY REVIEW
THE FACTS PLACED BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING
ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST ALDA J. HARRISON.
2. WHETHER OR NOT TO VACATE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT tTUDGMENT ENTERED
AGAINST ALDA J. HARRISON WAS WITHIN
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT.
3
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ARGUMENT
1. THE SUPREME COURT CAN ONLY REVIEW
THE FACTS PLACED BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT IN DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTING
ASIDE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST ALDA J. HARRISON.
In determining questions on appeal a reviewing
court must decide the issues from the record that was
before the trial court at the time of the error complained
of. This is the rule followed in the overwhelming
majority of the jurisdictions, including Utah. In 3
American Juris prudence, Section 692, pages 284 and 285,
the rule is stated as follows:
"It is a well-settled rule of appellate procedure
that all questions must be tried and determined
by the record as certified to the appellate court.
The record imports absolute verity and resort
cannot be had to anything dehors the record for
the purpose of contradicting it. (citations) In
other words, the record is regarded as conclusive,
(citations) and nothing can be assigned for error
which contradicts the record. (citations) ''
The same rule is applicable to interlocutory proceedings. In discussing the reYiew which an appellate
court may make of such proceedings, -! Corpus Juris
Secundum, Section 1160, pagP 1652, stat<.•s as follows:
''The action of the trial court upon interlocutory
proceedings will not be re,·iewed on appeal unless
the record sets out the motion and ruling thereon,
and such facts with regard to such proceedings
<IS will enable the appellate court to determine the
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correctness and propriety of the decision of the
trial court. (citations)''
In this respect the Utah Supreme Court, in the case
of United States Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Midvale
Home Finance Corporation, et al.,. being case No. 5462
as docketed in the Supreme Court, and reported in 46
P. 2d 672, held that :
''Jurisdiction
reviewing case
Court cannot
pleadings and
court.''

of Supreme Court is limited to
made in court below, and Supreme
determine questions not within
not heard or determined by trial

The order vacating the default and default judgment against Alda J. Harrison was entered after notice
and hearing. At the time of the hearing the only evidence
presented to the court was the affidavit of Alda J. Harrison. Appellants' counsel was present at the hearing,
but did not offer any counter affidavits or present any
evidence for the consideration of the court. THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFAULT
AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD OR SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN VACATED WAS NEVER AGAIN
BEFORE THE COURT.
The exhibits referred to by appellants in their brief
were introduced after the hearing on the motion to
vacate. They were introduced at the trial of the cause
on the merits where the issue of the default and default
judgment was not raised. The only issues raised at the
trial of the cause went to the merits of the case. These
exhibits cannot be used on appeal to prove error in
vacating the default and default judgment when they
5
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were not before the court when the order to vacate was
entered.
The only evidence which this court can consider in
determining whether or not the lower court committed
error in vacating the default and default judgment is the
evidence which was before the court when the issue of
the default and default judgment was raised. The only
evidence before the court at that time was the affidavit
of Aida J. Harrison.
2. WHETHER OR NOT TO VACATE THE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDG:JIENT ENTERED
AGAINST ALDA J. HARRISON WAS WITHIN
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE COURT.
The general policy of the law is that every man shall
have his day in court. This policy has always been
recognized by the Utah Courts, and our procedures have
been formulated so that substantial justice may be
encouraged and not obstructed by arbitrary rule. In the
case of Utah Commercial Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 198,
53 P. 1033, decided June 30, 1898, the court said, on
pages 207 and 208 of the Utah Reports :
''The power of the court to set aside judgments
by default is recognized and conferred in section
3005, R.S. Utah, and should be liberally exercised, for the purpose of directing proceedings
and h·ring causes upon their substantial merits;
and where the circumstances which led to the
default are such as to cause the court to hesitate,
it is bPt tt)r to resolve the doubt in fayor of the
application, so that a trial may be secured on the
merits.
• * *
''No general rule can he laid down respecting the
6
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discretion to be exercised in setting aside or refusing to set aside a judgment by default. So it
would be impossible to state what degree of negligence would justify the court in refusing relief
in all such cases. Each case must necessarily depend upon its own peculiar facts and circumstances, but the discretion should always be so
exercised as to promote the ends of justice.''
Utah has now adopted the Rules of Civil Procedure.
These rules continue the policy of seeking substantial
justice between litigants and leave to the sound discretion of the trial court whether or not to set aside and
vacate default judgments. Rule 35(c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, provides as follows :
''Setting Aside Default. For good cause shown
the court may set aside an entry of default and,
if a judgment by default has been entered, may
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule
60(b ). "
Rule 60 (b) provides a number of reasons which will
justify a court in vacating and setting aside a judgment,
and clearly indicates that the judge may exercise his
sound discretion in the rna tter. Subsection ( 7) of Rule
60(b) provides that in addition to the reasons named
a judgment may be set aside for
''any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment.''
Under the provisions of these rules the holdings
have consistently been that the trial court could vaeate
or refuse to vacate a default judgment at the exercise
of his sound discretion. Such was the holding of Warren
c. Di:run Rauch Co., 260 P. 2d 741, which stated that:
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"Though an equity court no longer has complete
discretion in granting or denying motion to vacate
judgment, it may exercise wide judicial discretion
in weighing the factors of fairness and public
convenience, and Supreme Court on appeal will
reverse trial court only where an abuse of such
discretion is clearly shown.''
In the matter of the discretion which may be exercised by the trial court see also: Salt Lake Hardware Co.
v. Nielson Land and Water Co., 43 Utah 406, 134 P. 911;
McWhirter v. Donaldson, 36 Utah 293,104 P. 731; Cutler
v. Haycock, 32 Utah 354, 90 P. 897; Nounnan v. Toponee,
1 Utah 168; Aaron v. Holmes, 35 Utah 49, 99 P. 450.
As heretofore stated, the only evidence before the
court at the hearing to set aside and vacate the default
and default judgment was the affidavit of Alda J. Harrison. This affidavit set forth the following facts:
1. That Alda J. Harrison was divorced from
respondent G. T. Harrison on :May 11, 1953.
2. That the divorce decree in that action ordered

G. T. Harrison to pay all commissions or costs
which might arise in relation to the Snow
Apartments.
3. That she believed that the divorce decree com-

pletely protected her from any action in connection with the Snow Apartments.
4. That she belieYed that by reason of the decree

G. rr. Harrison, alone, would be responsible for
aur claims arising from the sale of the Snow
Apa rtmcnt::;;.

6. rrlwt slw had no notire of judgment or of any
court proceedings until she rereiYed a notice
of ga rll i RhmL'll t pro reedings.
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6. That she did not willfully or intentionally
ignore the summons and complaint with the
intent of allowing the default and default
judgment to be entered.
7. That she desired to enter an appearance in the
action and to file an answer to the complaint.
(R. 16.)

It is submitted that the affidavit presented sufficient
facts to permit the trial court, in the exercise of its sound
discretion, to vacate and set aside the default and default
judgment. As was stated in the Utah Commercial Bank
case, supra:
''Each case must necessarily depend upon its own
peculiar facts and circumstances, but the discretion should always be so exercised as to promote
the ends of justice.''
The case has now been tried on the merits. In that
trial the court held that appellants had no cause of
action against Aida J. Harrison. If this court were to
reinstate the vacated default judgment the ends of justice would certainly not be served. Appellants would
then have a default judgment against Aida J. Harrison
when the trial court, in a trial on the merits, has held
that no cause of action existed against her.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE & MECHAM
By James L. Barker, Jr.

Attorneys for Alda J.
Harrison

9
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SECTION II
STATEMENT OF POINTS
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
NO CONTRACT BETWEEN WASATCH HOMES,
INC., AND RESPONDENTS.
ARGUMENT
3. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
NO CONTRACT BETWEEN WASATCH HOMES,
INC., AND RESPONDENTS.
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact, found that
the only contracts which were entered into by the respondents involving the sale of the Snow Apartments
were an Earnest Money Agreement and a Uniform Real
Estate Contract and that the only other parties to these
contracts were Einar Asp and his wife. The court
specifically found that ''there is no admissible evidence
as to the existence of a listing contract between either
G. T. Harrison or Aida J. Harrison and Wasatch Homes,
Inc." (Finding No. 5), and that Dean Perry "either in
his own capacity or as an agent of Wasatch Homes, Inc.,
was not a part~y to the Earnest Money Agreement.''
(Finding No. 6) (R. 114, 115)
In its conclusions of law the trial court held that
neither the above. mentioned Earnest Money Agreement
nor the Uniform Heal Estate Contract between the
Hc~pondents and the Asps constituted a contract between
Hespondents, or either of them, and \Yasatch Homes,
fne. (Conclusions 1, 2, 3, 4) (H. 115)
It is a fundamental principle of law that contracts
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involving the sale of real estate, to be enforcible, must
be in writing. Also, an agreement employing an agent
or broker to purchase or sell real estate, to be enforcible,
must be in writing. This is clearly set forth in the Statute
of Frauds, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 25-5-4,
subdivision ( 5) :
''In the following cases every agreement shall be
void unless such agreement, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by
the party to be charged therewith:

"* * *
'' (5) Every agreement authorizing or employing
an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate
for compensation.''
The decisions under this provision of the code
clearly indicate that an express oral contract to pay commissions to a real estate broker will not support a recovery unless there is an express contract in writing
authorizing the broker to make the sale. Annotated
under the above code provision is the case of Case v.
Ralph, 5-6 Utah 243, 188 P. 640, which held that:
"Under Comp. Laws 1917, Section 5817, requiring
agreements authorizing brokers to purchase or
sell real estate for compensation to be in writing,
an express agreement to pay commissions will
not support a recovery if there is no express contract authorizing the broker to make the sale."
and on page 641 of the Pacific citation the court states:
"In view of our statute of frauds and the authorities hereinafter referred to, the only matters that
ean be considered by us arise upon the first cause
of action, set forth in the complaint. The con11
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trolling question therefore is : Does the complaint
state a cause of action~
"Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 5817, so far as
rna terial here, provides :
'' 'In the following cases every agreement shall
be void, unless such agreement or some note or
memorandum thereof be in writing and subscribed
by the party to be charged therewith: * * * (5)
Every agreement authorizing or employing an
agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for
compensation or a commission.' ''
The court then cites a list of authorities in support
of this proposition.
In the present controversy there was absolutely no
written agreement between the Harrisons, or either of
them, and Wasatch Homes, Inc. Nor was there any
memorandum of any such agreement. As stated above,
the only agreements presented to the trial court were
agreements between the Harrisons and the Asps, agreements to which Wasatch Homes, Inc., was not a party.
The appellants, through random selection of statements in eYidence, contend that there was a parol agreement between :!\Irs. Harrison and Dean Perry involving
the sale of the Snow Apartments. EYen were this true,
a parol agn•ement "'ill not support a recoYery for a
commission for the sale of real property. To this effect
we eall the court's attention to the cases of 8 mith Realty
Oom Jwny c. Dipietro, et u:r, 77 Utah 176, ~92 P. 915, and
Van Lee111twn r. llujf'akcr, 78 Utah 321, 5 P. 2d 714, both
of whieh SJwcitical1~· hold that a broker must both allege
and proV<' au express coutract of employment as a basis
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of a broker's action to recover commissions, and that the
document or documents transferring or purporting to
transfer the properties between the buyer and seller are
not a sufficient agreement to take the matter out of the
statute of frauds.
CONCLUSION
The court having found no express contract between
either of the respondents and Wasatch Homes, Inc., or
between either of the respondents and Dean Parry as
agent of Wasatch Homes, Inc., and having further found
that the earnest money agreement entered into between
the respondents and one Einar Asp and his wife did not
constitute a contract between the respondents or either
of them and Wasatch Homes, Inc., respondents submit
that the decision of the trial court must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
SUMNER J. HATCH
JAMES L. BARKER, JR.
Attorneys for Respondents
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